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Abstract
Machine learning models have been shown to leak
information violating the privacy of their training
set. We focus on membership inference attacks on
machine learning models which aim to determine
whether a data point was used to train the victim
model.
Our work consists of two sides: We introduce
sampling attack, a novel membership inference
technique that unlike other standard membership
adversaries is able to work under severe restric-
tion of no access to scores of the victim model.
We show that a victim model that only publishes
the labels is still susceptible to sampling attacks
and the adversary can recover up to 100% of its
performance compared to when posterior vectors
are provided.
The other sides of our work includes experimental
results on two recent membership inference attack
models and the defenses against them. For de-
fense, we choose differential privacy in the form
of gradient perturbation during the training of the
victim model as well as output perturbation at
prediction time. We carry out our experiments
on a wide range of datasets which allows us to
better analyze the interaction between adversaries,
defense mechanism and datasets. We find out that
our proposed fast and easy-to-implement output
perturbation technique offers good privacy pro-
tection for membership inference attacks at little
impact on utility.
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1. Introduction
Recent machine learning (ML) methods – especially deep
learning approaches – largely owe their success to the avail-
ability of big data and the computation power to train huge
models with millions of parameters on this training dataset.
Often, people might assume that since these models are de-
signed to learn statistical properties of their training dataset,
they protect the privacy of the individuals who contribute
to these datasets. Unfortunately, this is not the case and
the ML models are proven to violate the privacy of this
training set in many unintended ways such as memorizing
details about the individuals (Song et al., 2017), leaking
features of their training set (Melis et al., 2019) and con-
tributing to re-identification problems e.g. via saving users’
geodata (Maouche et al., 2017).
In this study we are concerned with membership inference
(MI) attacks. These are attacks carried out by an adversary
who has complete or partial data records and access to a
trained victim ML model and wishes to know whether that
data record has been used to train the victim model. MI
attacks pose serious threats on the privacy of the individuals
present in databases and have been successfully applied on
models trained on image data, medical data, transaction
records, etc. (Nasr et al., 2019; Naranyanan & Shmatikov,
2008; Shokri et al., 2017; Song et al., 2019).
MI attacks are carried out in a black-box setting, where
adversary has no access to the internal parameters of the
victim model. The assumption is that posterior vectors
from the victim classifier suffice to reveal the membership
status of queried points. For our experiments, we chose
two standard MI adversaries: One that learns to distinguish
members of the training set from non-members and one
with prior belief on their differences (Salem et al., 2018).
We employ differential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2014) to
defend against MI attacks. DP is becoming more and more
popular as a method to protect the privacy of individuals
involved in a machine learning setting. It offers flexible tech-
niques which can be applied locally on the data (Kairouz
et al., 2014; Qin et al., 2016), or during the training on
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training parameters such as gradients (Abadi et al., 2016)
or the objective function (Zhang et al., 2012) or it can be
applied on the output of the function (McSherry & Talwar,
2007; Rastogi et al., 2009). We select DP-Stocahstic Gra-
dient Descent (DP-SGD) (Abadi et al., 2016) which is an
extensively-used gradient perturbation technique and com-
pare the protection it offers against MI attacks to an output
perturbation technique.
We also consider the extreme case of protection when the
scores are not published by the victim model and the ad-
versary only receives the predicted labels. This results in
standard MI attack methods to fail to perform. However, we
introduce a new sampling attack model which is constructed
to utilize only the labels. We show how in practice this
novel method compares with standard MI adversaries.
Our contributions:
• We introduce our novel sampling attack model which
performs membership inference under the severe re-
striction of no access to confidence scores of the at-
tacked classifier.
• We compile a comprehensive list of all the prominent
datasets in membership attack studies and compare
them under unified metrics and alongside each other.
This helps us better understand and analyze member-
ship inference attacks.
• Focusing mainly on the practical implications of differ-
ential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2014) rather than the
theoretical bounds on the privacy budget, we use DP
as a method to defend against membership inference
attacks. We show the interplay between datasets, attack
models and defenses.
• Considering the practical limitations of applying DP
during the training of the models, we formulate an
output perturbation method that can be applied on
models at prediction time. We also study the effect
of this method, which we call DP-Logits, as a de-
fense for membership attacks and contrast it with DP-
SGD (Abadi et al., 2016).
The structure of this paper is as follows: We first introduce
membership inference attacks in details in Section 2. We
then summarize possible defense methods against member-
ship adversaries in Section 3, with a focus on differential
privacy as a defense in Section 3.1. We formulate the novel
sampling attack and explain the details and practical meth-
ods to implement it in Section 4. We finally presents our
experimental results in Section 5.
2. Membership Inference
Membership inference attack decides whether or not a cer-
tain data point is a member of a dataset. The privacy risks
of membership inference attacks were first brought into
attention by Homer et al. (Homer et al., 2008) when they
demonstrated that they could successfully resolve the pres-
ence of an individual in a highly-complex DNA mixture.
One of their key findings is that publishing only the com-
posite statistics over a collection of genomic data would not
protect the privacy of the individuals who are members of
that collection. In a follow up paper (Wang et al., 2009)
they use more sophisticated test statistics to achieve better
results with less prior knowledge on the victims. Similar
attacks on other biomarkers such as microRNA have also
been successfully performed (Backes et al., 2016).
2.1. Membership Inference on Machine Learning
Models
The increased popularity of machine learning models trans-
lates to an ever-increasing need for data to train these mod-
els. This data often contains sensitive information from
individuals and protecting the privacy of it is of great impor-
tance. Therefore, our focus in this paper is on membership
inference attacks on machine learning models.
These models are usually trained on a set of data points
x so that the function f(x; θ), which is characterized by
parameters θ, is learned. In this context, the goal of the
adversary is to determine: given a trained victim model, is
a certain data point xi a member of the training set of this
model? i.e:
A(x;φ) : X → {0 (non-member), 1 (member)} (1)
where A is the adversary, φ are the parameters that the
adversary utilizes and X is the space of possible data points.
Now we will explain two adversarial models that cover
standard membership attacks. The first adversary requires
training with the objective of finding statistical differences
between members and non-member data points; whereas
the second model has a prior belief on these statistical dif-
ferences and no learning phase is required.
Learning Based Adversary First introduced in (Salem
et al., 2018), this adversary relies on training a shadow
model and a binary attack model. Shadow models mimic
the behavior of the victim model and are in the possession of
the adversary. The adversary can freely study the behavior
of these models as a surrogate for the victim models with
restricted access. The task of the binary attack classifier is
to classify its input as member/non-member of the training
set.
The following steps are taken by the adversary:
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1. Shadow model training: Train the shadow model
with a set of data point from the same distribution
as the training set of the vicitm model.
2. Binary classifier training: Query the trained shadow
model with its training set as well as a hold-out test
set. Collect the posteriors and pass them to the binary
attack classifier.
3. Attack the victim model: Query the victim model
with the desired data points and use the trained binary
classifier to decide the membership status.
The assumption about this attack is that the adversary has
a black box access to the victim model and can only study
the returned posterior vectors. In this method, only one
shadow model and one binary classifier are used. This can
be viewed as a relaxed version of multiple shadow models
and multiple binary classifiers of Shokri et al. (Shokri et al.,
2017).
We will refer to this attack model as LRN adversary.
Learning Free Adversary The dependence of the LRN
adversary on the shadow model and the binary classifier as
well as data to train these models, is an undesirable factor.
For this reason, Salem et al. (Salem et al., 2018) suggest
a more versatile model that requires no shadow model or
attack binary classifier. A black-box access to the victim
model is also assumed for this attack. The posterior vectors
from the victim model are inspected and if the maximum
element exceeds a calibrated threshold it will be classified as
a member, otherwise non-member. This can be summarized
in the following function:
A(x;T ) =
{
1 if maxy Pr(y|x) ≥ T
0 otherwise
(2)
which is parameterized by a single threshold T . The adver-
sary queries the victim model by data point x and decides
based on the maximum of the returned posterior vector
Pr(y|x) whether or not it is a member of the training set of
the vicitm model.
The name ”learning free” comes from the fact that no
shadow or attack classifiers are trained. We will refer to this
attack as LRN-Free adversary.
3. Defenses for Membership Inference
Attacks
In the previous section we defined the membership inference
attacks and described two generic models to carry out these
attacks in practice. Now, we will explore methods to defend
against them.
To defend against these attacks, we need to understand what
factors make these attacks possible and how we can limit
and paralyze the adversary. Most of the previous work
on defenses against membership inference attacks can be
summarized into two categories:
Generalization-based techniques (Shokri et al., 2017)
was the first to define the membership inference attacks in a
machine learning setting. They also identify the overfitting
of the victim model as one of the main culprits for vulnera-
bility to membership inference attacks. They hypothesize
that the victim model memorizes its training set such that
the posteriors show a statistical difference between the seen
and hold-out data. A more comprehensive study about the
correlation of overfitting to membership inference attacks
can be found in (Yeom et al., 2018).
These findings prompt a line of defense that relies on en-
forcing generalization on the victim model. (Shokri et al.,
2017) suggest using L2 regularization of the parameters and
restricting the number of training epochs. (Salem et al.,
2018) use dropout and ensemble learning to train the victim
model to help it generalize better. In a slightly different
approach, (Nasr et al., 2018) utilizes adversarial training of
the victim model in the form of a min-max game to help the
model generate indistinguishable predictions on its training
set and an unseen dataset.
Noising-based techniques Adding randomness to differ-
ent parameters of the victim model at different stages is
one of the most natural ways to confuse any adversary. In
fact, the first defenses against membership inference attacks
on the genome data (Wang et al., 2009) proposes adding
carefully-crafted noise to the published dataset.
Jia et al (Jia et al., 2019) suggest adding noise to the output
of the victim model. They generate specially-composed
noise vectors for the victim model’s posteriors such that
they act as adversarial examples for the attacker.
In a more formal and mathematics-driven line of work differ-
ential privacy is leveraged to add noise the gradients during
the training of the victim model (Jayaraman & Evans, 2019;
Rahman et al., 2018).
In this work we mainly focus on differential privacy as a
defense since it is a well-defined privacy framework and
very flexible with respect to the methods that can be applied
to build a differentially-private model. In the rest of this
section we introduce differential privacy and explain how it
can be utilized in our setting.
3.1. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2014; 2015; Dwork,
2011; Dwork et al., 2006) is a mathematical definition
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bounding the maximum divergence between the probabil-
ity distributions of the outputs of a mechanism M when it
is applied on two adjacent datsets d and d′. Two datasets
d, d′ ∈ D are adjacent when they differ in only one entry,
e.g. when the data of one user is removed from one of the
two identical datasets.
Definition We formally define a differentially private al-
gorithm M : D → R when the following condition holds:
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ (3)
where M is a randomized algorithm with domain D of
all possible datasets and range R, d and d′ are two adja-
cent datasets and S ⊆ R is the output of the algorithm M .
The privacy parameters (privacy budget)  and δ bound the
probability of the output being more likely for one dataset
compared to the other.
We say that the randomized algorithm M is (, δ)-
differentially private if Equation. 3 holds for some param-
eters , δ ≥ 0. It is usually suitable to set the value of
δ = 1/|d| where |d| is the number of data points in the
dataset. So we are mostly concerned with and aim to achieve
a smaller value of  since it guarantees more privacy.
Properties of differential privacy Next, we will intro-
duce two of the most important properties of differential
privacy:
1. Immunity to post processing (Dwork et al., 2014): Any
function of the output of the (, δ)-DP algorithm M
is (, δ)-DP. This means that an adversary without any
additional knowledge on the dataset, is unable to ex-
tract more information about the dataset with further
analysis of M .
2. Composition (Dwork et al., 2014): The combination of
two or more DP algorithms is also a DP algorithm with
degraded privacy budgets ′ and δ′. There are various
theorems which act under certain conditions to calcu-
late ′ and δ′ given the privacy budgets of each initial
mechanism. In the simplest form, the independent use
of k mechanisms, each (, 0)-DP is (k, 0)-DP.
Some DP Mechanisms Now that we are familiar with the
basics of differential privacy we can look at some mecha-
nisms that ensure DP:
1. Randomized response mechanism (Warner, 1965):
One of the oldest privacy-ensuring mechanisms, ran-
domized response was first used to protect participants
in surveys with a ”yes/no” possible answer. Assume
we are interested whether a property P is present in
participants. Participants are asked to flip a coin then:
if tails: respond truthfully
if heads: flip a coin again. If heads answer ”yes”
otherwise ”no”
For this mechanism  can be calculated as:
e =
Pr(answer = yes|truth = yes)
Pr(answer = yes|truth = no) =
3/4
1/4
= 3
So the randomized response mechanism is (ln(3), 0)
differentially private.
2. Gaussian Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2014): Consider
a deterministic real-valued function f : D → R, we
define the l2-sensitivity of f as:
∆2(f) = max
d,d′ adjacent
‖f(d)− f(d′)‖ (4)
We can approximate f with an (, δ)-DP function M
by adding Gaussian noise to it:
M(d) = f(d) +N (0, σ2) (5)
where N (0, σ2) is a Gaussian distribution with mean
0 and standard deviation σ ≥ c∆2(f)/, and c2 >
2 ln(1.25/δ).
3.1.1. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR MACHINE
LEARNING
For sophisticated processes which require a combination of
multiple functions, we can utilize and combine DP mech-
anism and use the composition theorems to keep track of
the accumulated privacy budget. In this paper we work with
deep learning models which are non-linear combination of
functions that are trained over multiple iterations. If we
aim to make a deep learning model differentially private,
we need to be cautious about the DP methods that are ap-
plied and how to correctly track the privacy budget. In this
section, we introduce two possible DP methods for deep
learning:
DP-Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) (Abadi
et al., 2016) This method achieves privacy by adding
noise to the parameters of the model during the training.
First, the gradients are clipped then an additive noise is
applied to them:
g¯t(xi)← gt(xi)/max(1, ‖gt(xi)‖2
C
) (6)
g˜t ← 1
L
(
∑
i
g¯t(xi) +N (0, (σCI)2)) (7)
where gt is the gradient vector at epoch t, C is the clip-
ping norm, L is the number of samples randomly chosen
for calculation of the gradient and N (0, σ2) is a Gaussian
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with standard deviation σ. This process can be viewed as
Gaussian mechanism on top of the stochastic gradient de-
scent. The reason behind the clipping step is to bound the
l2-sensitivity of the gradients.
The final privacy budget after the training can be calculated
with moments accountant which is a composition method
for a sequence of adaptive mechanisms.
DP-Logits While DP-SGD provides a strong guarantee,
for practical black-box deployment scenarios, these guar-
antees significantly hinder performance. For example, ap-
plying DP-SGD requires clipping of the gradients in each
step of the training which results in a slow-downed training
process. Also the accumulated value of  can potentially
grow to very large numbers for complex neural network
architectures that require many iterations of training and
are sensitive to noise. Furthermore, the party in the posses-
sion of a model may not always have access to the training
phase of the model. Consequently, we now work towards
an approach that perturbs the model outputs (rather that
all parameters) to specifically safeguard against black-box
membership inference attacks. This method can be rapidly
applied on top of any trained model.
For this, we use Gaussian mechanism to add noise to l2
normalized logits at prediction time:
l¯(xi)← l(xi)/max(1, ‖l(xi)‖
S
) (8)
l˜(xi)← l¯(xi) +N (0, (σSI)2) (9)
where l(xi) indicates the vector of logits for the input xi
and S is the clipping norm. The privacy budget with the
noise scale σ and l2 sensitivity S can be calculated as:
σ ≥ Sq

√
2 ln(
1.25
δ
) for δ =
1
|d| (10)
where |d| is the size of the training dataset, and q the number
of queries. As opposed to the DP-SGD method which is
applied during the training and leaves the trained model
immune to post-processing, adding noise to the logits at
the prediction time suffers from degradation by the number
of queries. Especially important is to restrict the number
of times that a same point can be queried, as an adversary
would be able to zero out the noise by repeated querying.
However, this method has the advantage of being fast and
easy to implement.
3.2. Argmax Defense
Diverging from differential privacy and the other suggested
defense methods, we can take a step back and tackle this
problem from a different perspective. To date, all the mem-
bership inference adversaries that we are aware of, rely on
and utilize the posterior vectors from the victim model. This
means that if the victim model returns the most confident
‘argmax’ label k = arg maxk Pr(y = k|xi) instead of the
full posterior, the adversary is unable to carry out the attack.
We refer to this method as argmax defense.
Note that the argmax defense is not always feasible, mostly
as a result of the problem design setting where the scores
are required and expected by the benign user.
4. Sampling Attack
In Section 3.2 we argued that the argmax defense is ef-
fective against all the previously-suggested membership
inference adversaries due to their dependence on the posteri-
ors vectors. Now we will introduce our novel attack method
which is designed to work under this severe restriction.
Attacks under limited access to the posterior vectors have
been studied before, for example, (Dang et al., 2017) pro-
pose evasion attacks when the score of the detector is not
accessible to the adversary. To fool the detector, they gener-
ate perturbations of the malicious sample and attempt to find
the first perturbed sample that traverses the malicious/benign
boundary of the detector. However, their attack does not
directly depend on the posterior vectors and the goal is to
only evade the detector.
Membership inference adversaries are designed to study the
posterior vector, so the idea behind our sampling adversary
is to reconstruct these vectors from the returned labels. We
achieve this by populating a sphere around each data point
with multiple perturbations of it and counting the number
of perturbed samples that fall under each label.
If x′ is a perturbation of data point x, from probability theory
we have:
Pr(y = c|x = xi) =
∑
x′∈X ′i
Pr(y = c, x′|x = xi) (11)
=
∑
x′∈X ′i
Pr(y = c|x′, x = xi)Pr(x′|x = xi)
(12)
=
∑
x′∈X ′i
Pr(y = c|x′)Pr(x′|x = xi) (13)
where X ′i is the space of possible perturbations of xi.
Line 11 is the marginalization over the perturbed data points
x′ and line 12 is the expansion according to the Bayes’ the-
orem. The transition to line 13 comes from the fact that the
victim models decision on the posterior of x′ does not de-
pend on the unperturbed point xi. The probability Pr(x′|x)
is the perturbation function acting on x. So this can be for-
mulated as a Monte-Carlo integration (MacKay, 1998) in
Sampling Attacks: Amplification of Membership Inference Attacks by Repeated Queries
the form of:
Pr(y = c|x = xi) = 1
N
∑
x′
Pr(y = c|x′) where x′ ∼ pert(xi)
(14)
But we do not have access to the posteriors Pr(y|x′), so
we propose relaxing Eq. 14 and using the returned labels
instead. Algorithm. 1 demonstrates how the sampling ad-
versary works. The perturbation function pert() acts on
each data point x to generate N perturbed samples and the
identity function I builds histograms over the labels of the
perturbed points. We hypothesize that this histogram can be
a suitable replacement for the posterior.
Algorithm 1 Sampling Attack
Input: Data points {x1, . . . , xM}, perturbation function
pert(xi; p). Parameters: number of perturbations N , per-
turbation scale p.
for i ∈ [M ] do
for n ∈ [N ] do
get labels: l = pert(xi; p)
end for
build histograms: Pr(y = c|xi) = 1N
∑
I(l = c)
end for
Output: Posterior vectors Pr(y|x)
In practice, the following steps are taken by the adversary:
1. Shadow model training: Train a shadow model with
data from the same distribution as the training set of
the victim model.
2. Sampling on the shadow model: Execute algo-
rithm. 1 for the training set as well as a hold-out test set
of the shadow model. Repeat for different perturbation
levels p.
3. Attack the shadow model: Using the reconstructed
posteriors from the previous step, attack the shadow
model with one of the conventional adversaries.
4. Attack the victim model: Choose the optimum value
of p according to some performance metric of the ad-
versary. Attack the victim model with the chosen p
value and the adversary from step 3.
In Table. 1 we compare the sampling attack with the LRN
and LRN-Free adversaries. The sampling attack requires
the training of a shadow model. If we choose LRN-Free
adversary for steps 3 and 4 of the sampling attack, no binary
classifier training is required.
5. Experiments
In this section we present the experimental results of mem-
bership inference attacks and the effectiveness of the sug-
gested defenses against them.
For the first two parts we mostly focus on the interplay of
adversaries and defense mechanisms from a practical point
of view. To this end we choose a collection of 8 different
datasets that were used in the most influential membership
inference attack studies (e.g. (Shokri et al., 2017; Salem
et al., 2018; Jia et al., 2019; Nasr et al., 2018)) to be able to
compare the results with one unified measure.
We choose two differentially-private defenses (see Sec-
tion. 3.1), one that perturbs the parameters of the model
and one that perturbs the outputs, and apply them on the
adversaries.
At last, with an insight into how adversaries work and what
datasets are worth further investigating, we present the re-
sults on our novel sampling attack technique.
5.1. Datasets
The datasets that we begin our experiments with, are:
MNIST The MNIST∗ dataset consists of 60, 000 training
data and 10, 000 test data of grayscale images of size 28×28.
These images depict handwritten digits (0 − 9) and are
centered with respect to the frame of the image.
FashionMNIST Created by Zalando†, this dataset con-
sists of 60, 000 and 10, 000 training and test set data points,
respectively. These images are also 28×28 and in grayscale
and represent 10 classes of fashion items such as ”tops”,
”trousers”, ”sneakers”, etc
CH-MNIST This preprocessed dataset obtained from
Kaggle‡ contains 5000 greyscale images of different types
of tissue in colorectal cancer patients. The size of images is
64× 64 and the task is to classify these images into one the
8 possible tissue categories.
CIFAR10, CIFAR100 We used CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100§ for our experiments. Both consists of color images of
size 32× 32 and have 50, 000 raining data and 10, 000 test
data. CIFAR-10 has 10 classes such as ”air plane”, ”dogs”,
”cats”, etc.:5000 randomly-selected images per class in its
training set and 1000 randomly-selected images per class
in its test set. On the other hand, CIFAR-100 has 20 su-
per classes, each containing 5 class (in total 100 classes)
∗http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
†https://www.kaggle.com/zalando-research/fashionmnist
‡https://www.kaggle.com/kmader/colorectal-histology-mnist
§https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
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Table 1. Comparison of LRN and LRN-Free to the sampling adversary. Full circles mean that the condition is required and the half full
circle means flexibility in terms of training.
adversary shadow model binary classifier data distribution access posterior access training
LRN      
LRN-Free - - -  -
sampling  -  - G
of different subjects such as animals, humans and vehicles.
Similar to CIFAR-10, it also has 5000 randomly-selected im-
ages per class in its training set and 1000 randomly-selected
images per class in its test set.
Purchase100 Purchase¶ is dataset of shopping history of
several thousand customers and the aim is to classify the
customers into k different classes of shopping styles so
that accurate coupon promotions can be suggested to them.
This dataset has no ground truth for the labels. Similar
to (Salem et al., 2018; Shokri et al., 2017), we use a simpli-
fied version of this dataset with ∼ 200, 000 data points and
a 600-dimensional vector of purchases per data point where
each element can take a value of either 0 or 1 (present or
not present in the shopping history). Afterwards, k-means
clustering algorithm (Lloyd, 1982) is used to cluster these
vectors into 100 classes. We call this version of the Purchase
dataset with 100 classes Purchase100.
Texas100 This includes patients’ data published by the
Texas Department of State Health Services‖. This dataset
contains 6, 169 binary features of 67, 330 patients, such
as diagnosis of various disease, procedures performed on
the patient and other properties of each patient. We use a
preprocessed version obtained from (Jia et al., 2019). Given
the input data of each patient, the task is to choose among
the most suitable procedure among the available 100 most
frequent ones.
Location This dataset is the binary representation of 446
locations∗∗ (either visited or not visited) by users. This
comes with 5, 010 data points and the task is to classify the
datapoint into one of the 30 possible classes. We obtained a
preprocessed version from (Jia et al., 2019).
5.2. Membership Inference Attacks on All Datasets
Throughout our studies we encountered many papers on
membership inference attacks and/or defenses against them
which each used different datasets and different metrics to
¶https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-
challenge/data
‖https://www.dshs.texas.gov/THCIC/Hospitals/Download.shtm
∗∗https://sites.google.com/site/yangdingqi/home/foursquare-
dataset
evaluate the success of the attacks and defenses. This moti-
vated us to first combine all these datasets under a unified
metric to be able to compare and better understand the re-
sults. We chose LRN and LRN-Free (see Section 2) as our
conventional adversaries. Below we explain the details of
our experiments:
Evaluation metrics To evaluate the performance of the
adversary we chose Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC)
since it is independent of the threshold that the adversary
chooses to distinguish members from non-members and
gives a better overview of the performance of the attacker.
An AUC value of 0.5 means random guessing and implies
completely unsuccessful attack, whereas AUC value of 1.0
implies a perfect attack.
Data splits We divide each dataset into 4 equal parts
Dvictimtrain , D
victim
test , D
shadow
train and D
shadow
test . For this purpose, all of
the training and test sets of MNIST, FashionMNIST, CH-
MNINST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and Location datasets are
combined and used. For Purchase100 and Texas100 we
use a total of 80,000 and 40,000 randomly selected points,
respectively.
LRN adversary We useDshadowtrain to train the shadow model.
After training we query the shadow model by its training
set and the unseen data points of Dshadowtest and use these pos-
teriors to train the binary classifier. We then test the perfor-
mance of the binary classifier on the posterior prediction of
the victim model when queried by its training set Dvictimtrain and
the unseen set Dvictimtest . To avoid choosing a decision thresh-
old, at this stage we only take the output of the sigmoid
function of the binary classifier. This allows us to calculate
the AUC values over decisions of the binary classifier.
LRN-Free adversary For a fair comparison with the
LRN adversary we only use Dvictimtrain and D
victim
test for our
learning-free method. We query the trained victim model by
its training data Dvictimtrain and the hold-out D
victim
test and take the
maximum element of the returned posterior vectors. Simi-
lar to LRN adversary, we refrain from choosing a decision
threshold and calculate AUC values over all the possible
thresholds.
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Victim model For all the image datasets (MNIST, Fash-
ionMNIST, CH-MNIST, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100) we
use a VGG-like (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) as shown in Figure. 1. For
Location we use a fully connected neural network with
layer sizes [256, 128, 128, 30]. For Texas 100 and Pur-
chase100 we use a fully connected neural network with
layer sized [512, 256, 128, 100]. We train these models with
AdamOptimizer with learning rate of 0.001. The max-
imum number of epochs is set to 50 but an early stopping
criterion is also set.
Shadow model We use the same structures as the vic-
tim model for the shadow model and train the model with
Dshadowtrain using the same procedure as the victim model.
Attack binary classifier For the attack classifier we use a
neural network with one 64-unit hidden layer and a sigmoid
output for the final binary classification.
Results and discussion Table. 2 demonstrates the evalu-
ated performance of the LRN and LRN-Free adversaries
on each dataset. We observe that the adversaries are more
successful (higher AUC) on datasets with lower test accu-
racy. This can be contributed to the inability of the victim
model to generalize well. Models that achieve higher test
accuracy do not overfit on their training data and output
posterior vectors that are statistically homogeneous across
all the data.
We can also see that the number of classes in each dataset
plays a role in the success rate of adversaries. For datasets
with comparable number of training points, those that have
fewer number of classes are less prone to attacks. This can
also be explained with the fact that it is easier for models to
generalize and perform for fewer number of classes.
We noticed that some datasets that were well-protected in
our experiments, that is MNIST, FashionMNIST and CH-
MNIST, were reported with high success rate of the adver-
sary in the previous literature. We relate this to a better
network structure and the application of an early stopping
mechanism in the training such that overfitting is avoided.
5.3. A Study of the Conventional Adversaries and
Defenses for Them
Now we will study the effect of differentially-private de-
fenses on LRN and LRN-Free adversaries. We proceed
with only CIFAR10/100, Texas100, Purchase100 and Lo-
cation since the AUC value for both adversaries for the
remaining datasets was close to chance level.
For defense, we choose DP-SGD that perturbs the param-
eters of the model during the training and DP-Logits that
adds noise to the outputs of the model after training (see
Table 2. Test accuracies versus performance of the LRN and
LRN-Free attacker for all of the datasets.
#classes/dataset accuracyDvictimtest AUCLRN AUCLRN-Free
10 MNIST 0.98 0.50 0.51
10 FashionMNIST 0.88 0.505 0.505
10 CH-MNIST 0.76 0.52 0.505
10 CIFAR10 0.69 0.60 0.59
100 CIFAR100 0.35 0.76 0.75
100 Texas100 0.56 0.72 0.67
100 Purchase100 0.78 0.60 0.58
30 Location 0.61 0.81 0.88
Section 3.1).
The adversarial models and their structure, the data split and
the evaluation metric are the same as the previous section.
DP-SGD Clipping norm C should be selected based on
the distribution over the unclipped gradients for each dataset.
We found that a value of 1 ≤ C ≤ 3 works best for
our datasets. Instead of noise level σ, we choose to re-
port the noise multiplier m = σ/C since the amount
of noise needed to achieve a certain level of privacy is
dependent on the clipping value C. We choose m ∈
{5×10−4, 10−3, 5×10−3, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0} for the
DP-SGD experiments. The value of δ is set to 1/|Dvictimtrain |
and  is calculated by the accountants method.
DP-Logits To choose a clipping value S, for each dataset
we calculated the histograms over the l2 norm of the un-
clipped logits. We then chose the 60th-percentile of these
histograms as the value for S. Similar to DP-SGD we
report in terms of noise multiplier m = σ/S. We chose
m ∈ {10−5, 5×10−5, 10−4, 5×10−4, 5×10−3, 10−3, 5×
10−2, 10−2} as the noise levels of this defense mechanism.
We set the value of δ to 1/|Dvictimtrain | and according to Eq.10
 can be calculated as:
 =
q
m
√
2 ln(1.25 ∗ |Dvictimtrain |1)
For LRN-Free adversary we set q = 1 since the
membership/non-membership status of each point is eval-
uated individually and independent of the results for other
data points.
For LRN adversary we need to set q = |Dvictimtrain +Dvictimtest |
since this is the number of times that the victim model is
queried by an adversary that is learning based.
Results and discussion Figure. 2 shows the trade-off of
accuracy and privacy for each defense method and different
levels of noise. Each color represents an adversary/defense
combination and each dot represents a different noise level
of the DP method. Dots are connected to each other in an
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Figure 1. The structure of the CNN used for all the image datasets. All the red squares indicate 3× 3 convolution filters and the blue
squares show 2× 2 pooling with stride of 2. In the end there are two fully-connected (FC) layers.
Table 3. Optimal values of noise multipliers and corresponding privacy budgets, for both methods
Method CIFAR10 CIFAR100 Purchase100 Texas100 Location
m∗DPSGD 0.001 0.005 0.05 0.01 0.5
DPSGD ∼ 109 ∼ 5× 107 ∼ 105 ∼ 106 ∼ 102
m∗DP-logits 0.01 0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.005
DP-logits LRN-Free ∼ 500 ∼ 5000 ∼ 5000 ∼ 104 ∼ 103
DP-logits LRN ∼ 107 ∼ 108 ∼ 108 ∼ 108 ∼ 106
increasing order of the value of noise. We observe that as
the noise level rises the accuracy of the model as well as the
performance of the adversary drop. What we are looking
for in these plots are operating points near the grey ”ideal
defense” bubble. This indicates an area where the accuracy
of the model does not suffer while the adversary is unable
to perform a successful attack.
Table 3 summarizes the (rounded) optimal values of noise
multiplier m and  for DP-SGD and DP-Logits. We found
these by inspecting the plots for the largest m value (highest
privacy) that falls within 80% of the initial accuracy. We
found that LRN and LRN-Free adversaries perform on the
same level and even for the DP-Logits method with very
different  values, neither outperforms the other. This can
be due to the fact that the LRN is not designed to learn the
noise structure of the DP-Logits.
We also observe that the privacy budget for the DP-Logits
method for LRN-Free adversary is generally lower than
the DP-SGD method. This was expected as the DP-SGD is
designed to protect the whole model including the internal
parameters and to achieve better test accuracy for the more
complex victim models that are applied on more advanced
datasets we need to allow a significant privacy budget. We
see that these models are highly sensitive to noise and high
values of noise that guarantees meaningful differential pri-
vacy bounds, completely destroys the utility of the model.
For LRN adversary repeated queries to the victim model
degrades the privacy budget significantly, however, as men-
tioned we do not find any difference in performance of these
adversaries.
But perhaps the most curious finding is that despite the very
large values of , our DP methods offer good protection
against membership inference attacks. This is most likely
due to the fact that these adversaries utilize very little infor-
mation from the models, for example no information from
the internal parameters, and the budget of a DP method is
defined to guarantee privacy under any adversarial technique
and any auxiliary information.
5.4. Novel Sampling Attack and Defenses for It
With an understanding of how the conventional membership
inference attacks perform in practice and how successful
different DP mechanisms are to defend against them, we
can start our experiments on the sampling attack. Similar
to Section 5.3 we choose the datasets that show meaningful
weaknesses towards adversaries.
The structure of the victim and shadow models are the same
as the previous sections.
Here also we decided to use two DP mechanisms for de-
fense against the sampling adversary. We choose DP-SGD
as a method that is applied during the training and random-
ized response that can be applied at prediction time (see
Section 3.1 and 3.1.1).
Sampling Attacks: Amplification of Membership Inference Attacks by Repeated Queries
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Accuracy
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
At
ta
ck
er
's 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (A
UC
)
DP-SGD and DP-logit CIFAR10
LRN adversary DP-SGD
LRN adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free adversary DP-SGD
LRN-Free adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free No defense
LRN No defense
Ideal defense
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
Accuracy
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
At
ta
ck
er
's 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (A
UC
)
DP-SGD and DP-logit CIFAR100
LRN adversary DP-SGD
LRN adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free adversary DP-SGD
LRN-Free adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free No defense
LRN No defense
Ideal defense
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Accuracy
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
At
ta
ck
er
's 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (A
UC
)
DP-SGD and DP-logit Location
LRN adversary DP-SGD
LRN adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free adversary DP-SGD
LRN-Free adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free No defense
LRN No defense
Ideal defense
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Accuracy
0.500
0.525
0.550
0.575
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
At
ta
ck
er
's 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (A
UC
)
DP-SGD and DP-logit Texas100
LRN adversary DP-SGD
LRN adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free adversary DP-SGD
LRN-Free adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free No defense
LRN No defense
Ideal defense
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Accuracy
0.500
0.525
0.550
0.575
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
At
ta
ck
er
's 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (A
UC
)
DP-SGD and DP-logit Purchase100
LRN adversary DP-SGD
LRN adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free adversary DP-SGD
LRN-Free adversary DP-logits
LRN-Free No defense
LRN No defense
Ideal defense
Figure 2. Results of application of DP-SGD and DP-logits for different noise levels. The accuracy of the vicitm model is shown on the
x-axis. Each dot represents a noise level and they are connected with an increasing level of noise.
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Sampling adversary For image datasets (i.e. CI-
FAR10/100) we choose pert(x; p) = x +N (0, p2) which
is an additive Gaussian noise to each pixel of the image in
each channel. We chose p = {i× 0.01|0 ≤ i ≤ 20, i ∈ N}.
For binary datasets (Location, Texas100, Purchase100)
pert(x; p) = flip(x). So we flip the values of each di-
mension with a probability p to the other value, that is, we
flip 1 to 0 and 0 to 1. The steps of perturbation are chosen
such that p = {i× 0.005|0 ≤ i ≤ 20, i ∈ N}
For all of the datasets, we chose to generate N = 100
perturbed samples for the attack.
For steps 3 and 4 of the sampling adversary (see Section 4)
We choose LRN-Free as the conventional adversary. This
is based on our findings from the previous section that
showed no significant difference between the performance
of LRN and LRN-Free . LRN-Free is more versatile
and reduces one extra step of the training an attack binary
classifier for the sampling adversary. The structure of the
LRN-Free is the same as the previous sections.
DP-SGD We use DP-SGD as the parameter perturbation
mechanism against this adversary. We pick the optimum
value of noise level from Table. 3 and run the sampling
attack on the model trained with this noise level of DP-
SGD.
Randomized response We choose randomized response
(see Section 3.1) on the returned labels, assuming that a
trained model that follows argmax protocol only allows
adjusting of the labels and not the logits. Since we have
more than two possible answers (labels), we modify the
randomized response with a fair coin, in he following way:
if tails: reveal the returned label
if heads: toss the fair coin again. If heads reveal the returned
label; otherwise uniformly at random choose one of the
remaining classes.
In this case, the privacy budget can be calculated as:
e =
Pr(revealed = k|returned = k)
Pr(revealed = k|returned = k’) =
0.75
0.25/(C − 1)
= 3(C − 1)
where C is the total number of classes in the labels. So this
mechanism is (ln(3C − 3), 0) differentially private.
The expected accuracy of the model after using this method
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Figure 3. Sampling attack versus the LRN adversary with full pos-
terior access for binary and image datasets. On x-axis the pertur-
bation scale is shown
can be calculated as:
accuracy =
nT
nT + nF
→ E[accuracyDP ] =
0.75 ∗ nT
nT + nF
+
0.25/(C − 1) ∗ nF
nT + nF
= 0.75 ∗ accuracy + 0.25
C − 1(1− accuracy)
where nT and nF indicate the number of points which cor-
rectly match the ground truth labels and the number of
points which deviate from the ground truth labels, respec-
tively. And nT + nF is the total number of data points that
the model was tested on.
Results and discussion In Figure. 3 we show the perfor-
mance of the sampling adversary for different perturbation
levels and compare it to the horizontal baseline of the LRN
adversary when the full posterior access is allowed.
We observe that the sampling adversary is able to gain up to
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Table 4. Best p value for sampling attack for each dataset
CIFAR10 CIFAR100 Purchase100 Texas100 Location
p∗ 0.13 0.11 0.015 0.005 0.015
Table 5. Sampling attack with the best p value on the victim model.
Dataset w/ access sampling DP-SGD RR
CIFAR10 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.53
CIFAR100 0.78 0.66 0.51 0.61
Purchase100 0.69 0.67 0.52 0.57
Texas100 0.64 0.63 0.51 0.59
Location 0.89 0.89 0.61 0.8
50% of its initial performance for image datasets and 100%
of the performance for binary datasets. The best result is
achieved for Location dataset and this could correlate with
the fact that location has the fewest number of features
among all datasets and the perturbations around each data
point are more meaningful and building the histograms over
the labels is more representative of the true posteriors.
Table 4 includes the best perturbation scales p with the
highest AUC of adversary, found for each dataset. We see
that this value is very small and particularly in the case of
the binary datasets a p < 0.015 works best. After this range,
further perturbation results in random and noisy behavior of
the sampling attack.
Next, we pick p∗ and attack the victim model. Table 5
shows the results for the LRN with access to posteriors,
the sampling attack AUC and sampling attack when DP-
SGD and randomized response are used. Both DP-SGD
and randomized response mitigate the risks of such attacks,
however DP-SGD seems to protect better and the attacker’s
performance drops to almost chance level, for most datasets.
We then study the effect of sampling number N on the per-
formance of the adversary on the victim model. We choose
N ∈ {10, 100, 1000} and calculate the AUC of the adver-
sary for the optimum p values from Table 4. The results are
shown in Table 6. As expected, higher number of queries im-
prove the attack. This is because according to Equation. 14
our estimate for the posterior limits to the true posterior
when n → inf . It is important to mention that querying a
victim model multiple times is not in general a desirable ac-
tion. A victim model can detect and block multiple queries.
We also observe that the increase in performance is more
noticeable between N = 10− 100 than N = 100− 1000,
so for these datasets N = 100 is an acceptable and safe
value.
At last, we also show the AUC values of the attack when
the optimum p of another dataset is used to attack. Table 7
shows the AUC of adversary on the victim model for differ-
Table 6. Effect of number of samples on attacks.
Dataset w/ access N=10 N=100 N=1000
CIFAR10 0.59 0.52 0.55 0.56
CIFAR100 0.78 0.60 0.66 0.68
Purchase100 0.69 0.57 0.67 0.68
Texas100 0.64 0.54 0.63 0.63
Location 0.89 0.80 0.89 0.89
Table 7. Transferring the best p between datasets
p 0.11 0.13 0.005 0.015
CIFAR10 0.55 0.54
CIFAR100 0.64 0.63
Purchase100 0.65 0.67
Texas100 0.63 0.54
Location 0.81 0.89
ent p∗ of datasets. We transfer the best perturbation scale
among image datasets and binary datasets, separately. These
results show us that an acceptable attack performance can be
achieved even when the adversary trains the shadow model
for a different dataset. With this strategy, the attacker is able
to train the shadow model once on a similar type of dataset
and carry out attacks on other data and save on the training
time.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
By evaluating membership inference attacks over a large
scope of different dataset, we highlight issues with the
rapidly developing research thread of membership infer-
ence. Often attack performance is assessed with different
type of models, while such performance cannot be seen in
isolation of data and training procedure. We urgently need
more transparency in reporting membership attack perfor-
mance in order to be really in a position to compare and
measure progress in this area. While a large fraction of
the work is focused on attacks, we also provide defense
evaluation. We investigate “standard” DP-SGD, but also
look at effective “post-hoc” defenses, that might be a lot
more practical (e.g. faced with “legacy” models) as they
can operate on already trained models and provide strong
protection.
Most notably, we investigate the argmax defense, which
previously was thought to prevent membership inference
attacks. While for previous attacks this is true, we show a
new sampling attack that attracts by repeated query of the
model surrogate information of the model that is able to
recover a large fraction of the attack performance. In turn,
we also present a modification of the randomized response
defense, that is in part capable of mitigating the new attack
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vector.
At time of publication, we will make all our attacks and
defenses publicly available – which constitute the largest as-
sembly of techniques in the scope of membership inference
attacks that we know of. We believe that this is a contribu-
tion that the community will also benefit from. We will also
publish our victim models and encourage to re-use these as
a point of reference, but advocate transparency and advise to
publish more details on training procedures in future work
as otherwise comparable results and ultimately the scientific
progress in this area is compromised.
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